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BURRIS v. STATE: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONTINUED
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE FOR ADMITTING THE
TESTIMONY OF GANG EXPERTS
MICHAEL JACKO ∗
In Burris v. State, 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland asked whether it
was appropriate to admit expert testimony on the culture and history of
street gangs when doing so could explain why witnesses recanted their pretrial statements concerning the defendant’s involvement in a murder case. 2
Acknowledging the potentially inflammatory nature of alleged gang membership, the court applied the two-part rule for admitting expert testimony
on gangs that it had previously adopted in Gutierrez v. State. 3 It unanimously concluded that while there was adequate fact evidence connecting
the murder to gang activity, the potential for unfair prejudice from the expert testimony outweighed its probative value.4 Therefore, the court held
that the testimony should have been excluded. 5 The court reached the necessary conclusion, but it missed the opportunities to further clarify the correct application of the Gutierrez test, and to define when, if ever, expert testimony could permissibly allege witness intimidation as an explanation for
why a government witness might recant her pretrial statements. First, the
court should have explicitly included in its test a requirement that the prosecution demonstrate the defendant’s gang affiliation by clear and convincing evidence.6 Second, it should have set forth a standard of proof required
to establish a gang connection to a crime. 7 Third, the court ought to have
stipulated a requirement that prosecutors demonstrate the presence of witness intimidation before a court might permit an expert to describe patterns
of witness intimidation generally. 8 Failing to include such safeguards in the
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1. 435 Md. 370, 78 A.3d 371 (2013).
2. Id. at 384, 78 A.3d at 379.
3. Id. at 386, 78 A.3d at 381 (citing Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 481–82, 32 A.3d 2, 5
(2011)).
4. Id. at 392, 78 A.3d at 384.
5. Id. at 397, 78 A.3d at 387.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See infra Part IV.C.
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state’s jurisprudence concerning such potentially toxic evidence as a defendant’s membership in a gang is to risk a significant curtailment of the
right to a fair trial.
I. THE CASE
On April 17, 2009, Shelton Burris was indicted in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City for the murder of Hubert Dickerson, Jr. 9 Prior to trial, the
State moved to introduce evidence pertaining to the history and organization of the Black Guerilla Family (BGF) gang and to Burris’ involvement
with that association, including expert testimony provided by Baltimore
City Detective, Sgt. Dennis Workley. 10 Over defense counsel’s objection,
the court allowed the testimony based on the State’s argument that the murder was a gang-ordered execution resulting from the victim’s failure to repay a debt to “Bam,” a BGF boss, and thus that Burris’ role in the BGF
provided motive for the killing. 11
At trial, the prosecution brought four different fact witnesses, each of
whom either completely recanted his or her previous statements connecting
Burris to the murder and to the BGF, or at least hesitated to reproduce such
testimony in open court. 12 The prosecution then brought to the stand Sgt.
Workley, who testified as to the history and culture of the BGF and its illegal activities within Maryland’s prison system, described Burris’ classification as a member of the BGF by the Division of Corrections, and interpreted Burris’ tattoos as evidence of self-identification with the BGF. 13 The
defense objected that all testimony concerning the BGF or Burris’ tattoos
was irrelevant and prejudicial because there was no evidence marking the
instant offense as a gang-related murder or identifying the perpetrator by his

9. Burris v. State, 206 Md. App. 89, 94, 47 A.3d 635, 638 (2012), rev’d, Burris v. State, 435
Md. 370, 78 A.3d 371 (2013).
10. Id. at 95, 47 A.3d at 638.
11. Id. at 95–96, 47 A.3d at 638–39.
12. Id. at 97–102, 47 A.3d at 640–42. One witness, who previously told the police that he
had heard Burris admit to killing a man and had heard Bam praise him for it, testified that he had
lied in the interview because he feared the police would charge him for drug possession. Id. at
97–99, 47 A.3d at 640–41. A second witness, who told police he had seen Burris shoot the victim,
testified that he made the story up on Bam’s instruction. Id. at 100–101, 47 A.3d at 641–42. The
third witness initially testified at trial that he had no recollection of discussing the murder with the
police, but eventually stated that he had heard Burris confess to killing someone who owed Bam
money. Id. at 102, 47 A.3d at 642. The fourth witness testified that she had been intoxicated during the interview with police in which she claimed to have heard Burris confess to a murder. Id.
13. Id. at 103–04, 47 A.3d at 642–43. Specifically, Sgt. Workley commented on the following tattoos: “Baltimore” and “Franklin” identify the territory in which Burris does business; the
number 187 next to a picture of a gun represents the California Penal code for homicide; “OG”
stands for “original gangster” and goes along with another tattoo, which reads “work real, real n--- don’t die;” that images of weapons represent the concept in gang culture of “death before dishonor,” and “Sixx 9” is Burris’ street name. Id. (altered from original).
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tattoos. 14 The court overruled these objections and admitted the testimony
based on its observations that fact witnesses had recanted their statements
prior to trial, that these witnesses had previously connected Burris to the
BGF, and that Sgt. Workley’s expert testimony concerning the BGF explained why those witnesses might have changed their statements. 15 The
court further stated that jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice that
Burris might suffer because of testimony connecting him to a street gang. 16
The jury convicted Burris of first-degree murder and of the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. 17
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals devised a test for admitting
expert testimony to explain witness recantation, holding:
[E]xpert testimony about the history, hierarchy, and common
practices of a street gang is admissible where: (1) the evidence establishes that a witness has previously given information to law
enforcement officers incriminating the defendant and the witness
recants the information at trial, (2) the reason for the recantation
is related to appellant’s membership in, or affiliation with, a gang,
and (3) the probative value of the expert testimony is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. 18
Applying this rule to the facts at hand, the court quickly concluded that the
first two of the above-enumerated conditions were met, i.e., (1) that witnesses had undisputedly recanted their pretrial statements19 and (2) that two
of those witnesses expressed that Burris’ BGF membership made them
afraid to testify against him. 20 As for the third condition, the court also
concluded that the probative value of Sgt. Workley’s testimony was not
outweighed by its potential to unfairly prejudice Burris. 21 The court noted a
number of factors demonstrating the probative value of this testimony, including: (1) that three witnesses recanted their statements; (2) that Sgt.
Workley’s opinion that Burris was a member of BGF added validity to
statements made by other witnesses; (3) that Burris’ tattoos confirmed his
self-identification as a gang member and connected him to the neighbor14. Id. at 95, 104, 47 A.3d at 638, 643.
15. Id. at 104–05, 47 A.3d at 643–44.
16. Id. at 105, 47 A.3d at 644. The eventual jury instructions read, in pertinent part: “The
Defendant is not charged with a crime involving being a member of any gang. Information about
the Defendant’s involvement if any with a gang was allowed only for you to understand the relationship between the Defendant and other parties in this case.” Id. at 106, 47 A.3d at 644.
17. Id. at 93, 47 A.3d at 637.
18. Id. at 126–27, 47 A.3d at 656–57 (citing Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 32 A.3d 2
(2011)).
19. Id. at 127, 47 A.3d at 657.
20. Id. at 129, 47 A.3d at 658.
21. Id. at 135–36, 47 A.3d at 662.

56

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 74:53

hood of the shooting; and (4) that the background information on the BGF
explained why witnesses would fear Burris, why they described him as a hit
man, and why Burris would obey the orders of “Bam,” a BGF boss. 22 In
light of that probative value, the court reasoned that potential prejudice to
Burris was relatively limited because (1) Sgt. Workley never said that Burris actually intimidated witnesses, (2) he did not opine as to Burris’ position
in the BGF, and (3) he never alleged Burris or the BGF committed any specific crimes. 23 Furthermore, while Sgt. Workley did testify as to the Division of Corrections’ classification of Burris, he avoided reference to Burris’
past convictions, or sentences. 24
Having thus described how the probative value of Sgt. Workley’s testimony outweighed the danger it had to prejudice Burris, the Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting said testimony. 25 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider
whether the circuit court erred in admitting extensive gang-related evidence,
particularly the testimony of an expert who explained why witnesses may
have recanted prior statements.26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
If admitted at trial, evidence of prior “bad acts” can have a tendency to
lead a jury to convict a defendant on the basis of her general character as
opposed to the evidence that the government presents concerning the criminal offense in question. 27 Aware of this danger, Maryland courts have established a three-step inquiry to determine whether bad acts evidence is
admissible: assessing the reason for admission, the strength of the connection between the defendant and the bad act in question, and the relative
prejudicial risk and probative value of admitting the evidence.28 When the
evidence in question is the testimony of a gang expert, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland has devised a more specific test, requiring 1) a connection between the gang activity and the crime in question and 2) a probative value
of admitting the evidence that is not outweighed by its potential for preju-

22. Id. at 131–35, 47 A.3d at 659–61.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 132–33, 47 A.3d at 660.
25. Id. at 136, 47 A.3d at 662. The Court of Special Appeals also considered two other
grounds for appeal: the appropriateness of a “CSI-type” voir dire question and the admissibility of
a recorded phone call between Burris and the girlfriend of one of the State’s witnesses. On both
grounds, the court upheld the circuit court’s rulings. Id. at 136–45, 47 A.3d at 662–67.
26. Burris v. State, 435 Md. 370, 384, 78 A.3d 371, 379 (2013).
27. Hurst v. State, 400 Md. 397, 407, 929 A.2d 157, 162 (2007); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664,
669, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976).
28. See infra Part II.A.
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dice. 29 The court laid out this test for gang evidence in State v. Gutierrez,
which provides a helpful exploration of how the test functions.30
A. The Maryland Rules of Evidence Restrict the Admissibility of “Bad
Acts” Evidence That Carries with It a Danger of Unfairly
Prejudicing the Defendant
“[T]here are few principles of American criminal jurisprudence more
universally accepted than the rule that evidence which tends to show that
the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on
trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible.”31 Generally speaking, the
key factor governing the admissibility of evidence is its relevance.32 Except
where prohibited by constitution, statute, or rule, relevant evidence is admissible, and “[e]vidence that is not relevant is [never] admissible.”33 Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-403 provides one such prohibition, asserting that
even if evidence is relevant, the trial court may exclude it whenever “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of,” among other
things, “unfair prejudice.” 34 Rule 5-404(b) identifies one particular avenue
of potential prejudice, namely: “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
including delinquent acts,” which is not admissible for the purpose of proving a defendant’s bad character.35 The term “bad acts evidence” refers to
such evidence generally. 36
While it is not always clear whether something constitutes a “bad
act,” 37 the Court of Appeals has explained that “a bad act is an activity or
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. State v. Taylor, 347 Md. 363, 369, 701 A.2d 389, 392 (1997) (quoting Cross v. State, 282
Md. 468, 473, 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978)).
32. See MD. R. 5-402.
33. Id. “Relevant evidence” means “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” MD. R. 5-401.
34. MD. R. 5-403.
35. MD. R. 5-404(b). Courts reason that if jurors are presented with evidence that a defendant
committed an unrelated bad action in the past, then there is a risk that they will conclude that the
defendant is a “bad person,” and that either she was more likely to commit any given crime, or she
should be convicted in the current litigation simply to punish her for being a bad person. Wynn v.
State, 351 Md. 307, 317, 718 A.2d 588, 593 (1998); Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 496, 597 A.2d
956, 960 (1991).
36. Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 489, 32 A.3d 2, 9–10 (2011).
37. “The most obvious reason for not defining ‘bad acts’ is that many acts, in and of themselves, are not ‘bad.’” Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 547, 735 A.2d 1061, 1071 (1999) (explaining that a given action often “cannot be said to be bad or good” until placed within the context of a lawsuit). Given the difficulty of such a definition, combined with the fact that the court’s
primarily concern is not to exclude some type of evidence for its own sake, but rather to avoid the
result of character assault, it is unsurprising that it has not prioritized a need to lay out a strict definition of “wrongs.” See Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 58, 665 A.2d 233, 237 (1995) (“[A]cts
that may reflect negatively on the defendant’s character implicate the policies underlying the rule
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conduct, not necessarily criminal, that tends to impugn or reflect adversely
upon one’s character, taking into consideration the facts of the underlying
lawsuit.” 38 Courts should generally not admit such evidence because of the
risk that it could encourage the jury to come to a guilty verdict even when
unsupported by the facts of the case before it. 39 The Court of Appeals has
declared that the rule governing the admissibility of evidence of other bad
acts should correctly be an “exclusionary” one.40 In other words, there is a
presumption that such evidence is inadmissible except where an exception
applies, 41 and the burden a party must carry in order to win admittance of
such evidence is significant. 42
The Court of Appeals interprets Rule 5-404(b), in combination with
Rule 5-403, to imply a three-step analysis for the admission of bad acts evidence (referred to at times as the Harris-Faulkner test). 43 First, a court
must inquire whether the state’s rationale for admitting the evidence would
fall under a recognized exception to exclusion.44 Second, the State must be
able to clearly and convincingly establish the basis for the bad act evidence
in question. 45 Finally, the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by any unfair prejudice that is likely to result from its admission. 46

against other crimes evidence.” (citing E. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
§2:14 (1994)).
38. Klauenberg, at 549, 735 A.2d at 1072.
39. Neam v. State, 14 Md. App. 180, 189, 286 A.2d 540, 545 (1972) (“The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal—whether judge or jury—is to give excessive weight to the vicious
record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or
to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.”
(quoting 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 194, at 646 (3d ed. 1940))).
40. Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 500, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (1991).
41. Id.
42. Id., 597 A.2d at 962 (“The exclusionary form of the rule clearly serves to remind the
bench and bar that, unlike most other evidence, this evidence carries with it heavy baggage that
must be closely scrutinized before admissibility is warranted.”).
43. Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 58–59, 665 A.2d 233, 237 (1995); see also Harris, 324
Md. at 497–98, 597 A.2d at 960; State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634–35, 552 A.2d 896, 898
(1989).
44. State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 489, 947 A.2d 519, 539 (2008) (citing Wynn v. State,
351 Md. 307, 317, 718 A.2d 588, 593 (1998)).
45. Id.
46. Id., 947 A.2d 539–40.
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1. Step One in the Harris-Faulkner Test Is to Ask Whether the
Evidence Under Consideration Fits into One of the Recognized
Exceptions to the Rule Against Admitting Evidence of Prior Bad
Acts
The first step in the test for assessing the admissibility of bad acts evidence is to determine whether it serves an approved purpose. 47 Such a purpose demonstrates that the evidence has “special relevance”—that is, it is
“substantially relevant to some contested issue in the case and [not be] offered” simply to prove criminal character. 48 So what purposes are legitimate? Rule 5-404(b) offers a list of permissible justifications for admitting
bad acts evidence, including “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.” 49 Essentially, this amounts to a list of possible contested issues to which bad acts evidence might have “special relevance.”50 While
admitting that this list of actions is not exclusive, the Court of Appeals adheres fairly closely to it. 51
For example, in Harris v. State, 52 in which the defendant was being
tried for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, the Court of
Appeals ruled it improper to admit evidence of his prior conviction for possession with the intent to distribute heroin. 53 “Tendency to commit similar
crimes” is not one of the exceptions listed in Rule 5-404(b), and the court
declined to find it a legitimate reason to introduce bad acts evidence.54

47. Id.
48. Harris, 324 Md. at 497, 597 A.2d at 960. This special relevance requirement involves
two parts: 1) the relevance must be substantial, that is, not simply technically related to a formal
element of the case; and 2) it must relate to an issue that is actually in dispute. Emory v. State,
101 Md. App. 585, 602, 647 A.2d 1243, 1252 (1994).
49. MD. R. 5-404(b). Collectively, these are often referred to as “the Ross factors.” Along
with the list eventually codified in MD. R. 5-404 (b), the court in Ross v. State, 267 Md. 664, 350
A.2d 680 (1976), also acknowledged that
[a]dditional exceptions have also been recognized: When the several offenses are so
connected in point of time or circumstances that one cannot be fully shown without
proving the other, and to show a passion or propensity for illicit sexual relations with
the particular person concerned in the crime on trial, and to prove other like crimes by
the accused so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the
accused.
Id. at 669–70, 350 A.2d at 684 (citation omitted).
50. See Harris, 324 Md. at 500, 597 A.2d at 961 (substituting a description of “special relevance” for the list of approved exceptions).
51. State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 489 n.12, 947 A.2d 519, 539 n.12 (2008).
52. 324 Md. 490, 597 A.2d 956 (1991).
53. Id. at 504, 597 A.2d at 964.
54. Id. at 502, 597 A.2d at 962 (“[T]o be admissible there must appear between the previous
offense and that with which the defendant is charged some real connection other than the allegation that the offenses have sprung from the same disposition. We find no such real connection or
special relevance here.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Step Two in the Harris-Faulkner Test Is for the Court to
Determine Whether the Government May Clearly and
Convincingly Demonstrate the Bad Acts Evidence in Question.

Provided that the bad acts evidence in question does advance a legitimate purpose, the court’s second step should be to determine whether the
State is able to demonstrate the bad act through clear and convincing evidence. 55 Whether the State can meet this standard of proof is a decision belonging to the court,56 and typically requires the government to proffer its
evidence outside of the presence of the jury. 57 As for the requisite strength
for evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard, the Court of Appeals has held that it is not as demanding as a beyond a reasonable doubt
requirement, but is greater than a preponderance of the evidence standard.58
The evidence in question “should be ‘clear’ in the sense that it is certain,
plain to the understanding, and unambiguous and ‘convincing’ in the sense
that it is so reasonable and persuasive as to cause you to believe it.” 59 The
Court of Appeals does not require that to be clear and convincing, evidence
must “be established with absolute certainty,” and if the evidence is “to
some degree conflicting,” that need not necessarily prevent a trial judge
from finding that the standard is met. 60 On review, an appellate court will
not overturn the trial judge’s decision on the second prong of the HarrisFaulkner test unless it is clearly erroneous. 61
55. “Similar act” and other Rule 5-404(b) evidence may only be admitted “if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act.”
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (upholding the trial court’s admission of
testimony regarding the defendant’s previous sales of stolen merchandise when his defense to
knowingly possessing and selling stolen blank videocassettes was that he did not know they were
stolen).
56. Emory v. State, 101 Md. App. 585, 622, 647 A.2d 1243, 1262 (1994).
57. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 478 n.7, 386 A.2d 757, 764 n.7 (1978) (“The preferred
method for submitting any evidence of other crimes to the court during trial would be by way of a
proffer to the trial judge outside the presence or hearing of the jury. Such a proffer not only protects the jury from immediate prejudice, but also allows the trial judge to determine whether there
is any way to limit the prejudicial aspects of the evidence while retaining its probative character
and whether the evidence should properly be introduced at that time.”).
58. Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 470, 554 A.2d 1231, 1236 (1989).
59. Id. at 470–71, 554 A.2d at 1237 (quoting THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, MARYLAND PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 1:8(b) (2d ed. 1984)).
60. Id.
61. Emory, 101 Md. App. at 622, 647 A.2d at 1262. In Whittlesey v. State, the court set forth
a narrow exception to the Harris-Faulkner test: “where the probative value of the evidence does
not depend upon proof that the misconduct actually took place, the court should not apply the
clear-and-convincing requirement in assessing the admissibility of the testimony.” 340 Md. 30,
61, 665 A.2d 223, 238 (1995) (holding that even though the government positively disproved the
defendant’s anecdote that he had frightened a woman by following her with a knife, and thus the
content of that story failed under the second prong of Harris-Faulkner, the statement was still admissible because it demonstrated the defendant’s willingness to lie in order to explain his whereabouts at the time of the murder for which he stood trial).
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In Cross v. State, 62 a grand larceny case, the government presented evidence that the defendant had also been involved in a burglary on the same
day as the crime in question. 63 In the burglary, which went uncharged, a
witness identified a car at the scene, but other than a matching color and
make, there was no evidence that the car belonged to the defendant (the
witness provided a different license plate number) or that the defendant was
present at the burglary crime scene.64 The government also presented evidence that an empty beer bottle found at the scene matched the brand of a
six-pack that the defendant bought earlier that day. 65 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals found for the defendant on the grounds that the State could not
clearly and convincingly connect him to the prior bad act, the burglary. 66
Evidence of that act thus failed the second prong of the Harris-Faulkner
test. 67
3. The Third Step in the Harris-Faulkner Test Is to Weigh the
Probative Value of the Bad Acts Evidence Against Its Potential
to Prejudice the Defendant
The final and most involved question of the Harris-Faulkner test is
that the probative value of the evidence under consideration not be outweighed by its potential to unfairly prejudice the defendant.68 While Rule
5-404(b) does provide a list of nine permissible reasons to admit bad acts
evidence and only one impermissible reason,69 this numerical imbalance
does not indicate that bad acts evidence is admissible more often than not.
Rather, because Rule 5-404(b) must be read in the context of Rule 5-403,
even when one submits bad acts evidence for a legitimate purpose, the court
still must weigh the evidence’s probative value against its potential for creating unfair prejudice. 70

62. 282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757 (1978).
63. Id. at 469–71, 386 A.2d at 759–60.
64. Id. at 479, 386 A.2d at 764.
65. Id. at 479–80, 386 A.2d at 764.
66. Id at 479, 386 A.2d at 764 (“In this case, one would be hard put to urge that the evidence
of the petitioner’s involvement in the . . . break-in was ‘clear and convincing’; in fact, it was so
deficient that it would not even suffice to create a jury issue were [the petitioner] being tried for
any crime associated with [that] incident.”).
67. Id.
68. State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 489, 947 A.2d 519, 539–40 (2008).
69. See supra text accompanying note 49.
70. The Advisory Committee’s Note to the Federal Rule of Evidence on which MD. R. 5404(b) is based supports this reading: “The determination must be made whether the danger of
undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other
means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403.”
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note subdiv. b.
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The kind of unfair prejudice that would outweigh probative value “involves more than damage to the opponent’s cause.” 71 Rather, unfair prejudice refers to something that makes the jury lose its objectivity or disregard
the weight of the evidence presented.72 Thus, probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice when the evidence encourages jurors to make a primarily emotional response as opposed to a rational one. 73
When the evidence is sufficiently probative, it is more likely to appeal to
the jury’s rationality, and thus, any prejudice resulting from its admission is
appropriate rather than unfair. 74 The Court of Appeals has implied that the
potential prejudicial value of bad acts evidence is so significant that there is
essentially a rebuttable presumption that such evidence is inadmissible. 75
The relative weight of the probative versus prejudicial value of evidence of prior bad acts was critical to its admissibility in Odum v. State. 76
There, the defendant was initially charged, along with four co-defendants,
with the armed robbery, carjacking, kidnapping, and murder of two victims. 77 “The jury acquitted him of all charges save for two counts of kidnapping.” 78 On appeal, the defendant won a new trial on the kidnapping
counts, and on retrial he unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of his
involvement in the robbery, carjacking, and murder that accompanied the
kidnapping. 79 After determining that the offenses were so closely connected with the kidnappings as to form one crime, the Court of Appeals ruled
that “[a]lthough the evidence surely prejudiced Petitioner, we are not persuaded that it unfairly prejudiced him, much less that the prejudice ‘substantially outweighed’ the probative value of the evidence.”80
Even though there is a strong presumption against the admissibility of
prior bad acts evidence, 81 the prosecution may overcome that presumption
provided that it can meet the requirements of the Harris-Faulkner test. 82 In
71. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 102, 517 A.2d 741, 747–48 (1986).
72. Odum v. State, 412 Md. 593, 615, 989 A.2d 232, 245 (2010) (quoting LYNN MCLAIN,
MARYLAND EVIDENCE STATE AND FEDERAL § 403:1(b) (2d ed. 2001)) (“[E]vidence may be unfairly prejudicial ‘if it might influence the jury to disregard the evidence or lack of evidence regarding the particular crime with which [the defendant] is being charged.’”).
73. Id. (quoting JOSEPH F. MURPHY JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE HANDBOOK
§ 506(B) (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2007)).
74. Id. (“The more probative the evidence is of the crime charged, the less likely it is that the
evidence will be unfairly prejudicial.”).
75. Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 500, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (1991) (indicating that bad acts
evidence ought generally to be excluded, except when it has special relevance to some contested
issue, and its probative force “substantially outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.”).
76. 412 Md. 593, 989 A.2d 232 (2010).
77. Id. at 596, 989 A.2d at 234.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 596–600, 989 A.2d at 234–36.
80. Id. at 615, 989 A.2d at 245.
81. Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 500, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (1991).
82. State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634–35, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989).
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practice, however, this test requires some adjustments in order to apply to
various types of bad acts evidence.
B. Details Relating to a Defendant’s Involvement in a Street Gang Are
a Particular Form of Bad Acts Evidence That Some Courts Have
Found to Require Special Consideration
The Burris court faced a problem of how to deal with a particular sort
of bad acts evidence, namely: expert testimony pertaining to a defendant’s
involvement in a street gang. Membership in a gang does not obviously fall
under the statutory categorization of “other crimes, wrongs, or . . . delinquent acts,” 83 but it fits more clearly under the Court of Appeals’ definition
of bad acts evidence as “activity or conduct, not necessarily criminal, that
tends to impugn or reflect adversely upon one’s character, taking into consideration the facts of the underlying lawsuit.” 84 Therefore, Maryland
courts have treated a defendant’s gang involvement as a bad act for the purpose of making decisions on the admissibility of evidence.85
In many jurisdictions, courts conclude that evidence relating to a defendant’s membership in a gang, like that of other bad acts, may be admissible for a purpose such as identification, proof of motive, or other reasons
similar to those listed in Maryland’s Rule 5-404(b). 86 Such purposes

83. MD. R. 5-404(b).
84. Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 549, 735 A.2d 1061, 1072 (1999); see also James
Blake Sibley, Gang Violence: Response of the Criminal Justice System to the Growing Threat, 11
CRIM. JUST. J. 403, 411 (1989) (“[A]ny attempt to use . . . information [related to gang membership] as character evidence must be avoided.”).
85. Ayala v. State, 174 Md. App. 647, 658, 923 A.2d 952, 958 (2007) (“There can be little
doubt that evidence that a defendant is a member of an organization known for violent acts may be
evidence of bad character or prior bad acts.”). Many jurisdictions with similar rules have similarly
found that evidence of a defendant’s gang involvement should be governed under rules for admitting bad acts evidence. See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Accused’s
Membership in Gang, 39 A.L.R. 4TH 775 (2010) (surveying jurisdictions and concluding that
“[w]hile commonly recognizing that evidence identifying a defendant as a member of a gang may
be prejudicial, since juries may associate such groups with criminal activity and improperly convict on the basis of inferences as to the defendant’s character, many courts have held that such
evidence may nevertheless be admissible if it is sufficiently relevant to a proper issue in the case,
weighing this probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice”).
86. Theuman, supra note 85 (“Gang membership has frequently been found to be probative
and admissible, for example, as evidence of a possible motive for the crime, particularly in homicide cases where the defendant and his victim are shown to have been members of rival gangs; as
an indication of possible bias on the part of defense witnesses who are shown to be members of
the defendant’s gang; as evidence of a common design or purpose in crimes committed by a
group; or as bolstering the identification of the defendant, such as in cases where witnesses describe the perpetrators as having worn gang colors.”); see also People v. Tolliver, 807 N.E.2d 524,
541 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“Gang-related evidence is admissible to show common purpose or design, or to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act. Gang-related evidence is also relevant to identification or to corroborate a defendant’s confession.”(citations omitted)).
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demonstrate special relevance. 87 Evidence of gang involvement is inadmissible, however, when it is not relevant to a contested issue in the case.88
The Court of Appeals first confronted the question of whether to admit
expert testimony on gangs in Gutierrez v. State. 89 There, it devised a twopart test to govern the admissibility of expert testimony on gangs. 90 First, a
court must ask whether there is evidence connecting the crime to gang activity, and second, it must inquire whether the probative value of such testimony is outweighed by the potential unfair prejudice of admitting it. 91
1.

Courts Should Only Consider the Admission of Expert
Testimony on Gangs When Such Evidence Bears a Connection
to the Crime Charged

The Court of Appeals has held that in the case of expert testimony as
to the workings of a gang, the threshold requirement is fact evidence that
the crime was gang-related. 92 Once the government makes such a showing,
the defendant’s gang membership goes from being “an impermissible prior
bad act to a concrete component of the crime for which the defendant is on
trial.” 93 The requirement of demonstrating a connection between gangrelated activity and the crime serves the same function as Rule 5-404(b)’s
list of exceptions to the exclusion of bad acts evidence in general, that is,
both force the prosecution to show that the evidence has special relevance
to the trial. 94
87. Theuman, supra note 85 (“[M]any courts have held that [evidence of gang membership]
may nevertheless be admissible if it is sufficiently relevant to a proper issue in the case, weighing
this probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice.”); see also supra Part II.A.1.
88. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 496, 32 A.3d 2, 13 (2011) (“Proof of . . . a link
[between gang activity and the crime in question] transforms a defendant’s gang membership, current or prospective, from an impermissible prior bad act to a concrete component of the crime for
which the defendant is on trial.”); Tolliver, 807 N.E.2d at 541 (“Testimony regarding the background, history and criminal activity of the gangs is improper if peripheral to the offense at issue.”).
89. See Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 490–95, 32 A.3d at 10–13 (summarizing the practice adopted
by courts in other jurisdictions as well as that of the Court of Special Appeals, but making no reference to any decisions by the Court of Appeals).
90. The Court of Appeals does not explain how the Gutierrez test fits with the HarrisFaulkner test described in Part II.A. For more discussion on how the two might be reconciled, see
infra Part IV.A.
91. Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 496–98, 32 A.3d at 13–15.
92. Id. at 496, A.3d at 13.
93. Id. In requiring that evidence of a gang connection be established by fact evidence before
expert testimony on the subject is admissible, the Maryland Court of Appeals explicitly sided with
the Supreme Court of New Mexico’s decision in State v. Torrez, 210 P.3d 228 (N.M. 2009), rather
than with the Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Ayala v State, 174 Md. App. 647,
923 A.2d 952 (2007), which claimed that the State did not need to present evidence that a crime
was gang-related when it could show that the defendant was a member of the gang and that such
membership created a plausible motive for the crime. Id. at 496 & n.2, 32 A.3d at 13–14 & n.2.
94. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
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A prosecutor might seek to admit testimony concerning gangs as a
means of explaining why a defendant would commit a crime. 95 For example, prior to trial in Ayala v. State, 96 the defendant in a murder case admitted
to police that he was a member of one gang and that he believed the victim
to have belonged to a rival gang, members of which had recently beaten
him. 97 The Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to
admit the testimony of a gang expert who spoke, among other things, about
the importance in gang culture of “getting at” members of a rival gang and
the discipline a member could face for failing to “represent” his gang. 98
Another common reason for prosecutors to submit gang-related evidence is to explain why witnesses might have recanted their previous statements to the police. Prior to Burris, no Maryland court had addressed the
use of expert testimony to explain witness recantation, but several other jurisdictions have. 99 In People v. Gonzalez, 100 the Supreme Court of California held that the testimony of a gang expert concerning a culture of witness
intimidation might be relevant to assess the credibility of a witness who repudiated at trial his previous statements to police. 101 The court reasoned
that “[w]hether members of a street gang would intimidate persons who testify against a member of that or a rival gang is sufficiently beyond common
experience that a court could reasonably believe expert opinion would assist
the jury.” 102 Similarly, in People v. Dixon,103 the Appellate Court of Illinois
held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence for the purpose of explaining the witnesses’ change of
heart at trial.” 104 In that case, the court declined to narrow the parameters of
relevance surrounding a gang expert’s testimony. For example, the witness
need not belong to the gang in order for evidence of intimidation to be relevant because “a gang may inspire fear in non-members as well as its own
members.” 105 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the issue regarding fear
of retaliation is one of the witness’s state of mind rather than gang members’ deliberate choice to intimidate.106 Finally, the court held that the de-

95. Establishing motive is one of the acceptable reasons to admit bad acts evidence. MD. R.
5-404(b).
96. 174 Md. App. 647, 923 A.2d 952 (2007).
97. Id. at 653–54, 923 A.2d at 955–56.
98. Id. at 655, 665–66, 923 A.2d at 956, 962–63.
99. Burris v. State, 206 Md. App. 89, 125–26, 47 A.3d 635, 656 (2012) rev’d, 435 Md. 370,
78 A.3d 371 (2013).
100. 135 P.3d 649 (Cal. 2006).
101. Id. at 657–58.
102. Id. at 657.
103. 882 N.E.2d 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
104. Id. at 681.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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fendant need not be aware of the witness intimidation for evidence thereof
to be relevant. 107
Some jurists argue, however, that merely providing a possible explanation for why witnesses would recant their previous statements is not, on its
own, sufficient to admit a gang expert’s testimony concerning witness intimidation. In People v. Tolliver, 108 the Appellate Court of Illinois considered a case in which, at trial, six eyewitnesses recanted their prior statements implicating the defendant in the shooting death of a plainclothes
police officer. 109 To explain those recantations, the trial court admitted testimony by an expert regarding punishments that gangs carry out against
those who witness against their members. 110 While the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision,111 the presiding judge on the panel dissented, expressing concern that the prosecution failed to present any evidence
that the witnesses had, in fact, been intimidated. 112
2.

Even If Gang-Related Expert Testimony Is Relevant to the
Crime, the Court Should Only Admit It into Evidence When Its
Probative Value Is Not Outweighed by the Potential Unfair
Prejudice That Will Result

The second prong of the Gutierrez test for the admissibility of expert
testimony concerning gangs, to balance the probative versus prejudicial
value of the testimony, is a direct carry-over from the Harris-Faulkner test
for admitting bad acts evidence in general, and from Rule 5-403. 113 The potential for prejudice with respect to gang-related testimony is very real. 114
Because citizens associate gangs with crime, identifying a defendant as a
gang member introduces the risk that a jury will convict based on his presumably bad character regardless of the evidence presented against him. 115
Therefore, courts may exclude evidence when it is probative to no contested
issue or only a minor one or when the same point could have been made
with evidence that is less prejudicial.116
107. Id.
108. 807 N.E.2d 524 (Ill. App. Ct., 2004).
109. Id. at 531–33.
110. Id. at 530.
111. Id. at 542.
112. Id. at 556 (Campbell, P.J., dissenting in part). There was also concern that the witnesses’
prior statements might have been involuntary by reason of police coercion, and therefore improperly admitted. Id. at 555.
113. See supra Part II.A.3.
114. Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 495, 32 A.3d 2, 13 (2011) (“[W]e remain ever-cognizant
of the highly incendiary nature of gang evidence and the possibility that a jury may determine
guilt by association rather than by its belief that the defendant committed the criminal acts.”).
115. Theuman, supra note 85 (“[J]uries may associate [gangs] with criminal activity and improperly convict on the basis of inferences as to the defendant’s character[.]”).
116. Id.
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C. After Adapting the Harris-Faulkner Test to the Unique
Circumstances of Expert Testimony Concerning Street Gangs, the
Court of Appeals in Gutierrez v. State Affirmed the Lower Court’s
Decision to Admit Such Testimony in That Case
The facts of Gutierrez v. State, 117 the case in which the Court of Appeals devised the above-described test, provide a useful illustration of how
the court intended it to be applied. In Gutierrez, the defendant was on trial
for murder. 118 According to witnesses, the victim was standing with a
group when a car drove up, and a passenger shouted, “Mara Salvatrucha!” 119 One person in the group responded by insulting the gang MS13, upon which the passenger opened fire, killing the victim. 120 Eventually,
witnesses identified the defendant as the shooter. 121
At trial, after several pieces of evidence tied the defendant and the
murder to MS-13, a detective testified concerning a variety of elements of
that gang’s history and culture. 122 He explained the process of “jumping
in,” by which one can earn admission to the gang, and that the location of
the shooting was within the territory of Mexican gangs, considered rivals to
MS-13. 123 He went on to portray how gangs encourage their members to
respond violently both to criticism of and to false identification with their
gang (“false-flagging”). 124 Furthermore, he described how the defendant
identified himself with MS-13 through his MySpace page. 125 The expert
also opined that MS-13 was the gang from which law enforcement had seen
the most violence in the previous four to five years.126
After setting forth the legal background concerning the admissibility
of prior bad acts in general, and the Harris-Faulkner test specifically, 127 the
Court of Appeals announced that the threshold requirement for the admissibility of gang-related expert testimony is that there be sufficient fact evidence establishing a connection between the gang and the crime. 128 The
court found that there was sufficient evidence to connect the murder to gang
activity in this case for two reasons. First, several witnesses testified to
hearing the shooter exclaim “Mara Salvatrucha,” an MS-13 slogan, and
117. 423 Md. 476, 32 A.3d 2 (2011).
118. Id. at 482, 32 A.3d at 5.
119. Id.
120. Id., 32 A.3d at 5–6.
121. Id. at 483, 32 A.3d at 6.
122. Id. at 484, 32 A.3d at 6.
123. Id. “Jumping in” is a ritual of induction in which a prospective member is beaten by a
group of current members. Id. at 8.
124. Id. at 484, 32 A.3d at 7.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 489–91, 32 A.3d at 9–10; see also supra Part II.A.
128. Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 496, 32 A.3d at 13.
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hearing someone respond by insulting that gang before the shooter opened
fire. 129 Furthermore, another witness stepped forward claiming to have
been a passenger in the car and acknowledged that the defendant fired into
the crowd as a means of gaining membership to MS-13. 130
The court next indicated that the second element of the test is to evaluate the expert’s testimony to determine whether its probative value is not
outweighed by the risk of unfairly prejudicing the defendant. 131 First, as to
the danger of unfair prejudice, the court pledged to “remain ever-cognizant
of the highly incendiary nature of gang evidence and the possibility that a
jury may determine guilt by association rather than by its belief that the defendant committed the criminal acts.”132 As to the probative value of the
testimony, the court found that four out of five of the expert’s statements to
which the defense objected directly helped to explain some element of the
crime. 133 The description of the gang’s name explained the gunman’s
words at the time of the shooting; the description of “jumping in” supported
testimony that the shooting was an attempt to join the gang; the explanation
of how gang members respond to insults with punishment “up to death”
helped make sense of the seemingly disproportionate brutality of the act;
and the statement concerning reactions to “false flagging” illustrated how
important the sense of exclusivity and hierarchy are to gang members. 134 In
light of the significant probative value of the evidence and the relatively
weak risk of unfair prejudice, the court said that these statements were
properly admitted. 135 The only statement that the court found to be erroneously admitted was the detective’s identification of MS-13 as the gang from
which local police had seen the most violence in recent years. 136 This
statement did not help the jury to understand why the defendant was the
person who committed the crime, and thus held no probative value. 137 The
court, however, found this to be harmless error in that the statement was unlikely to have made the jury arrive at a guilty verdict if it was not already
prepared to do so. 138
Dissenting, Chief Judge Bell argued that while the court adopted the
correct test, the expert testimony in the case did not pass either its first or its
second step. 139 First, Chief Judge Bell argued that the expert testimony
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 497, 32 A.3d at 14.
Id.
Id. at 497–98, 32 A.3d at 14–15.
Id. at 495, 32 A.3d at 13.
Id. at 498–99, 32 A.3d at 15.
Id. at 499, 32 A.3d at 15.
Id., 32 A.3d at 15–16.
Id., 32 A.3d at 16.
Id.
Id. at 499–500, 32 A.3d at 16.
Id. at 501, 32 A.3d at 17 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
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failed the relevancy prong of the analysis in that the prosecution had no
need to demonstrate motive as it was not an element of the charged offense
of murder, 140 nor did the defendant adopt a defense, for example, selfdefense, that would challenge the presence of motive. 141 Because motive
was not relevant to a contested issue, the expert’s testimony was distinguishable from other cases in which such testimony was permitted, claimed
Chief Judge Bell. 142 However, the Chief Judge did not stop there: not only
were the expert’s statements irrelevant, but because the risk of unfair prejudice from admitting such evidence far outweighed its potential probative
value, the evidence failed to meet the test’s second prong as well.143 The
probative value was diminished, he said, because through their testimony,
fact witnesses had already established a connection between the defendant,
the gang, and the shooting. 144 Therefore, the expert testimony had little to
add. 145 Moreover, the potential for unfair prejudice was significant when a
police officer aligned the defendant with a group he described as extremely
violent. 146 Accordingly, the Chief Judge believed that the expert’s testimony met neither prong of the test for admissibility and thus would have reversed the trial court’s decision. 147
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Burris v. State, 148 the Court of Appeals of Maryland unanimously
declined to follow the intermediate court’s focus on witness recantation.149
Instead, it applied the Gutierrez test and held that testimony regarding the
defendant’s involvement in gang activity was not admissible under the in-

140. See id. at 506, 32 A.3d at 19 (recalling that “other crimes” evidence is only admissible
when it “is substantially relevant to some contested issue and is not offered simply to prove criminal character.” (quoting State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 488, 947 A.2d 519, 539 (2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
141. Id. at 507, 32 A.3d at 20 (“[E]vidence of motive ‘serves no legitimate purpose,’ and is
therefore not material, when motive is not an essential element of any offense charged and when
the prosecution is aware that it will not be contested.” (quoting Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248,
254–55, 389 A.2d 1374, 1377–78 (1978))).
142. Id. at 512–13, 32 A.3d at 23–24.
143. Id. at 518, 32 A.3d at 27.
144. Id. at 519, 32 A.3d at 27.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 519, 32 A.3d at 28.
147. Id. at 501, 512–14, 519, 32 A.3d at 17, 24–25, 28. In a portion of his dissenting opinion
in which Judge Greene also joined, Chief Judge Bell also disputed the court’s conclusion that the
admission of the statement identifying MS-13 as the most violent gang in the area represented
harmless error. Id. at 520–23, 32 A.3d at 28–30.
148. 435 Md. 370, 78 A.3d 371 (2013).
149. Id. at 397, 78 A.3d at 387.
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stant conditions, 150 thus reversing the Court of Special Appeals’ judgment. 151
The Court of Appeals explained that under the facts in Burris, the twostep Gutierrez test for admitting expert testimony as to gang culture and the
defendant’s membership in a gang ought to control.152 Again, in the first
step of this analysis, a court must ask whether there is sufficient fact evidence to support a nexus between a defendant’s alleged gang membership
and the crime in question.153 Applying this threshold requirement, the court
agreed that the evidence in the instant case was sufficient to tie the crime to
Burris’ gang membership. 154 Witness statements provided a basis to argue
that Burris was a gang member, and that his alleged position in the gang
relative to Bam (hit man to boss) established a nexus between the offense
and his membership. 155
Having satisfied itself that this first requirement was met, the court
proceeded to ask whether it should nonetheless exclude the expert testimony because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. 156 Here, the court held that the probative value of Sgt.
Workley’s testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 157 The testimony concerning the violent, criminal nature of the BGF “was prejudicial
to Burris because of its negative implication regarding Burris’s character,”
and the testimony concerning the BGF’s illegal activities within prisons
was not probative because the crime at issue did not involve a prison. 158
Also, statements describing the violent imagery of Burris’ tattoos and the
connection of such imagery to prison culture invited the jury to make inferences regarding his propensity to kill as well as to his history of incarceration. 159 Furthermore, to the extent that Sgt. Workley’s testimony identified
Burris as a BGF member, it was cumulative of the evidence presented by
the other witnesses and was therefore not probative. 160 Finally, Sgt. Work150. Id. at 390–97, 78 A.3d at 383–87.
151. Id. at 397, 78 A.3d at 387.
152. Id. at 390, 78 A.3d at 383; see supra Part II.B.
153. Burris, 435 Md. at 390, 78 A.3d at 383; see supra Part II.B.1. The court clarified that
while the gang connection to the crime ought to determine whether gang membership has become
a component of the crime (as opposed to evidence of a prior bad act), the defendant need not be
charged with a “gang crime” to meet this requirement. Burris, 435 Md. at 391, 78 A.3d at 384.
154. Id. at 392, 78 A.3d at 384.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see supra Part II.B.2. The court clarified that “evidence is considered unfairly prejudicial when it might influence the jury to disregard the evidence or lack of evidence regarding the
particular crime with which [the defendant] is being charged.” Burris, 435 Md. at 392, 78 A.3d at
384 (quoting Odum v. State, 412 Md. 593, 615, 989 A.2d 232, 245 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
157. Burris, 435 Md. at 392, 78 A.3d at 384.
158. Id. at 394, 78 A.3d at 385.
159. Id. at 394–95, 78 A.3d at 385–86.
160. Id. 395–96, 78 A.3d at 386.
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ley’s testimony did not link the murder to debt collection, nor did it establish that a BGF “hit man” would play a role in extortion, nor did it show
how Burris’ gang membership would explain witness recantation.161
Given the above analysis, the court determined that the unfair prejudice generated by Sgt. Workley’s testimony outweighed its probative value. 162 Accordingly, it held that the trial court erred in allowing said testimony and therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial.163
IV. ANALYSIS
In Burris, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the Gutierrez test to
determine that the trial court improperly admitted the evidence. However,
it missed an opportunity to establish a precedent that would enable more
just and consistent results in the future concerning the admissibility of expert testimony regarding street gangs. The court could have done so if it
had enhanced its decision in three principle ways. Part IV.A will discuss
why the court ought to have explicitly retained the Harris-Faulkner test’s
requirement that the prosecution demonstrate the defendant’s gang membership by clear and convincing evidence. Part IV.B will discuss the desirability of specifying a standard of proof for the threshold requirement of evidence connecting the crime with gang activity. Part IV.C will propose that
for an expert to testify about specific gang behaviors such as witness intimidation, the prosecution must first present evidence that such behaviors actually occurred in connection to the instant case.
A. While the Gutierrez Rule Provides the Correct Guidance in That
Case as Well as in Burris, It Lacks the Protections Granted by the
Second Element of the Harris-Faulkner Test
Both the Gutierrez and the Burris courts cited the Harris-Faulkner test
for the admission of bad acts evidence. 164 The Gutierrez court then went on
to create a more specific, two-step rule to apply to the admission of expert
testimony on the history, organization, and customs of street gangs, 165 a rule
that the Burris court later cited. 166 Mysteriously lost in the process was the
second step of the Harris-Faulkner test, requiring a party seeking its admission to establish bad acts evidence clearly and convincingly. 167 While prosecutors could easily satisfy that prerequisite under the facts in both
161. Id. at 396, 78 A.3d at 386–87.
162. Id. at 392, 78 A.3d at 384.
163. Id. at 397, 78 A.3d at 387.
164. Burris v. State, 435 Md. 370, 390 n.14, 78 A.3d 371, 383 n.14 (2013); Gutierrez v. State,
423 Md. 476, 489–90, 32 A.3d 2, 10 (2011).
165. Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 496–98, 32 A.3d at 13–15.
166. Burris, 435 Md. at 390, 78 A.3d at 383.
167. See supra Part II.A.2.
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Gutierrez and Burris, this requirement could provide an important protection to defendants in future cases. Therefore, the court should not discard
it.
The Gutierrez and the Harris-Faulkner tests substantially overlap one
another. 168 Step one of the Gutierrez test fulfills the same purpose as step
one of the Harris-Faulkner test, that is, both function to ensure that the evidence has “special relevance” to a contested issue.169 Step two of the
Gutierrez test is identical to step three of the Harris-Faulkner test. 170
Without explicitly stating why, the court has neglected step two of the Harris-Faulkner test for the admission of bad acts evidence.
In Gutierrez, the State brought ample evidence that the defendant was
a member of MS-13, including photographs from his MySpace page depicting him making identifiable MS-13 hand gestures, and testimony by the
driver in the incident that the defendant’s reason for shooting the victim
was to gain entry into the gang. 171 Similarly, in Burris, two fact witnesses
made statements to police that Burris was a member of BGF, and the prosecution’s expert interpreted photographs of his tattoos to indicate the same
conclusion. 172 Thus, in both cases, the prosecution could demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the prior bad act it sought to admit (that
is, membership in a gang) actually applied. In other words, the evidence
satisfied the second step in the Harris-Faulkner test.
One could, however, imagine facts satisfying both steps of the
Gutierrez test, but where the prosecution is unable to clearly and convincingly show that the defendant is a member of a gang, which would be required under the Harris-Faulkner line of cases. In such a situation, the defendant would face all of the prejudice that would come with gang
involvement without the court being certain that he is a gang member. For
instance, assume a hypothetical situation similar to the facts of Gutierrez:
there is a drive-by shooting where the gunman shouts a gang slogan, the
victim or someone in the victim’s vicinity counters by insulting the gang,
and both the defendant and a vehicle to which he has access match descriptions from witnesses to the crime. However, to depart from the facts in
168. The Harris-Faulkner test indicates that a court should only admit bad acts evidence
when: 1) the reason for admitting the evidence falls under an approved Ross exception, 2) the
prosecution can establish the evidence of bad acts clearly and convincingly, and 3) the probative
value of admitting the evidence is not outweighed by its potential unfair prejudice. State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634–35, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989). The Gutierrez test indicates that a court
should only admit expert testimony with respect to gangs when: 1) fact evidence establishes that
the crime is gang-related, and 2) the probative value of the testimony is not outweighed by its potential unfair prejudice. Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 496–98, 32 A.3d at 13–15.
169. See supra notes 48–51, 85–88 and accompanying text.
170. See Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 498, 32 A.3d at 15; Faulkner, 314 Md. at 635, 552 A.2d at
898.
171. Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 484, 497, 32 A.3d at 5–6, 14.
172. Burris v. State, 435 Md. 370, 376, 381, 78 A.3d 371, 375, 378 (2013).
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Gutierrez, assume further that any evidence that the defendant is a member
of the gang fails to meet the clear and convincing standard: perhaps he socializes with known gang members, but he has no gang-related tattoos; police records reveal no known gang affiliation; and the state produces no
witnesses who will testify to his involvement in a gang. 173 The shouted
declarations for and against the gang would support a claim by the prosecution that there is evidence that the crime was gang-related, and it is possible
that a court would still assess the probative value not to be outweighed by
prejudice were a gang expert to testify as to gang-related motives for the
crime. 174 However, a defendant in this situation needs and deserves the
protection of a rule demanding that the prosecution clearly and convincingly show a connection between the defendant and the gang as well as between the gang and the crime. 175 Without such protection, a government
expert would be able to discuss gang culture as it pertains to the crime, stirring up fears and negative associations in the minds of jurors, without ever
demonstrating that gang culture connects the defendant to the crime. Certainly, such a defendant would still be able to argue against introduction of
this evidence under the Harris-Faulkner precedent, but it would be clearer
if the specific rule for admitting testimony by a gang expert explicitly included this requirement.
B. The Court Ought to Have Specified a Minimum Standard for the
Evidence of Gang-Connection Because, as in Burris, the Facts May
Only Establish a Tenuous Connection Between the Crime and Gang
Activity.
The first step in the Gutierrez test, the determination whether fact evidence provided sufficient connection between the crime in question and
gang activity, 176 is necessary but is incomplete until case law establishes the
standard of proof that the prosecution must meet in order to satisfy that requirement. The court held that testimony by fact witnesses gave evidence
to such a connection both in Gutierrez and in Burris. However, the connection in the latter case is less clear-cut than in the first, which raises the question: what is the minimum standard of proof that is acceptable in similar
cases? Because the Harris-Faulkner test requires a clear and convincing
173. We could imagine evidence that meets a lesser standard, but that is not clear and convincing, for instance, all of the clothes in his closet are of an identifiable gang color, or he has tattoos
that are ambiguous in their connection to gang culture.
174. Admittedly, because the potential for unfair prejudice is higher where the evidence of the
gang connection is not clear and convincing, a court could still refuse to admit such evidence
based on the second step of the Gutierrez test. However, preserving a separate clear and convincing requirement provides a stronger safeguard than does blending it in with the balancing test.
175. Like the parallel requirement of the Harris-Faulkner test, such a showing should be made
to the judge, outside of the presence of the jury. See supra note 57.
176. Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 496, 32 A.3d at 13.
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showing that a defendant committed a prior bad act, 177 the court would
achieve some sense of symmetry were it to require the same standard to establish a gang connection to a crime. But specifying any standard would be
preferable to leaving defendants in the dark as they weigh their trial strategies and judges free to make inconsistent rulings on whether the State carried its burden of establishing a connection.
In concluding that there was ample evidence establishing a gang connection to the murder in question, the Gutierrez court referred to the sworn
testimony of witnesses to the murder. First, one witness, who admitted to
driving the car from which the shooter fired, acknowledged that the defendant perpetrated the attack in order to gain admission into MS-13. 178 Also,
multiple witnesses testified that the gunman shouted a known MS-13 slogan, “Mara Salvatrucha!” 179 This factual evidence convinced the Gutierrez
court that there was a gang connection to the murder, and thus, that the
prosecution satisfied the test’s first requirement.180 Whether the appropriate
standard is clear-and-convincing or a simple preponderance of the evidence,
the government certainly met its burden. In fact, it might have proven its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Burris court likewise found that the facts of that case evidenced a
gang connection. 181 Specifically, the court referred to pre-trial statements
of witnesses that:
Burris and Bam were BGF members; Bam was a “boss” within
the organization; Burris was a “hit man for real” for Bam who
was told by Bam to commit the killing; that Bam, apparently, responded to Burris’s telling him that he “just killed a boy,” by stating “[t]hat’s my boy, straight G[ue]rilla”; and Burris was overheard stating that he committed a murder because the victim
owed Bam money. 182
While the quoted summary by the Burris court at first sounds like a convincing argument for a gang connection to the murder, there are several reasons for which one might hesitate to reach that conclusion. Most critically,
all of the fact evidence cited by the court came from pre-trial statements
that witnesses later recanted, rendering the connection less reliable than it
would have been if supported by consistent, sworn testimony. Secondly,
even if one were to rely on the recanted statements, one could still question
the witnesses’ basis of knowledge for their conclusion that the murder was
committed to avenge a debt that Dickerson owed Bam. Considering these
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra Part II.A.2.
Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 497, 32 A.3d at 14.
Id.
Id.
Burris v. State, 435 Md. 370, 392, 78 A.3d 371, 384 (2013).
Id.
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shortcomings, the prosecution in Burris may not necessarily have made its
case by a clear and convincing standard, 183 even if it did meet a simple preponderance of the evidence standard. 184
The principal concern with claiming that fact evidence establishes the
relevancy of a gang connection to the crime in Burris is that all the fact evidence in question came in the form of statements that witnesses recanted at
trial. 185 Granted, the court did admit these witnesses’ pretrial statements into evidence for purposes of impeaching their contrary testimony under
oath. 186 Nevertheless, these statements fail to provide the same basis for a
gang connection as did the sworn statements provided in Gutierrez, which
were not recanted. 187 Not only is the gang connection less reliable by virtue
of its reliance on recanted statements, but there is no evidence that the wit-

183. For a discussion of the clear and convincing standard, see supra text accompanying notes
58–60.
184. In addition to these shortcomings, some observers might argue that motive was not relevant to the crime, and that there was no other reason to discuss a gang connection in this case.
This complaint echoes a point in Chief Judge Bell’s dissent from Gutierrez, in which he argued
that unless motive was an element of the crime or the defendant made motive an issue through an
affirmative defense, “evidence of motive serves no legitimate purpose, and is therefore not material, when motive is not an essential element of any offense charged and when the prosecution is
aware that it will not be contested.” 423 Md. 476, 507, 32 A.3d 2, 20 (2011) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248, 254–55, 389 A.2d 1374, 1377–78 (1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The problem with the Chief Judge’s position in Gutierrez is that it seems inconsistent with
earlier decisions by the Court of Appeals with respect to other types of bad acts evidence. For
example, in Snyder v. State, Chief Judge Bell himself wrote for the court that, “[m]otive is not an
element of the crime of murder, but, in addition to supporting the introduction of other crimes evidence, it also may be relevant to the proof of two of the other exceptions to Rule 5–404, intent or
identity.” 361 Md. 580, 604, 762 A.2d 125, 138 (2000). Similarly, the Maryland Criminal Pattern
Jury Instructions support the admissibility of evidence showing motive. THE MARYLAND
INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF LAWYERS, INC., MARYLAND
CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3:32 (2d Ed. Supp. 2013) (“Motive is not an element of
the crime charged and need not be proven. However, you may consider the motive . . . or lack of
motive as a circumstance in this case. Presence of motive may be evidence of guilt. Absence of
motive may suggest innocence. You should give the presence or absence of motive the weight
you believe it deserves.”). The evidence in question, suggesting that Burris killed Dickerson because the latter owed money to Burris’s boss, Burris, 435 Md. at 376, 78 A.3d at 374–75, seems to
establish that Burris meant to kill, thus motive would be relevant to show intent.
The Snyder court raised one further requirement on the admission of bad acts evidence for
purposes of showing motive, requiring that the prior conduct “be committed within such time, or
show such relationship to the main charge, as to make connection obvious.” Snyder, 361 Md. at
605, 762 A.2d at 139 (quoting Johnson v. State, 332 Md. 456, 470, 632 A.2d 152, 158–59 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted). As gang membership is an on-going consideration, it would
meet the requirement of being linked in time and circumstances to a gang-ordered murder.
185. Burris, 435 Md. at 392, 78 A.3d at 384 (“Fact evidence adduced at trial in the alleged
statements of fact witnesses that were introduced, established that both Burris and Bam were BGF
members.”); id. at 375–76, 78 A.3d at 374–75.
186. Id. at 376, 78 A.3d at 375. Admitting these statements for impeachment purposes was
appropriate according to the Maryland Rules of Evidence. MD. R. 5-613.
187. See Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 497, 32 A.3d at 14 .
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nesses recanted because of gang member intimidation. 188 While the State
might have established such a connection by a simple preponderance of the
evidence, it would be difficult to say that the State established a clear and
convincing connection between gang activity and the murder given the diminished weight that one would reasonably accord the recanted statements.
Furthermore, even if the State witnesses’ pretrial statements were reliable, one must ask whether these statements are sufficient to tie the victim’s
murder to BGF activity. One witness claimed in his statement to the police
to know that the defendant worked for Bam as a hit man, that both were
BGF members, and to have heard Bam praise the defendant for the murder. 189 Again in a statement to police, another witness claimed to know that
the victim owed Bam money. 190 A third witness claimed to overhear the
defendant say that pursuant to Bam’s instruction, he killed someone who
owed Bam money. 191 Accepting these statements at face value, they still do
not allow the final logical connection that the murder was related to the defendant’s membership in the BGF, 192 but they provide evidence that could
at least arguably meet simple preponderance standard.
On the question of meeting the first requirement of the Gutierrez test,
that is, establishing a gang connection to the crime for which the prosecution seeks to admit gang evidence, Burris represented a closer case than
Gutierrez. Without specifying a minimum standard of evidence for this
part of the test, it is difficult to say whether or not the court was correct to
conclude that the prosecution in Burris met its burden. Accordingly, it will
be difficult for defendants in future borderline cases to weigh trial strategies, and for judges to make consistent decisions. Therefore, the court
would have established a more useful precedent if it had made such a clarification.
C. While the Burris Court Correctly Concluded That the Potential
Prejudice of the Contested Expert Testimony Outweighed Its
Probative Value, It Missed an Opportunity to Add a Requirement
That the Probative Value of Expert Testimony Be Supported by
Relevant Fact Evidence.
The final step in the Gutierrez analysis is to determine whether the
probative value of the testimony given by the state’s gang expert is not
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.193 In Gutierrez, the court
188. Burris, 435 Md. at 396–97, 78 A.3d at 387.
189. Burris v. State, 206 Md. App. 89, 98–99, 47 A.3d 635, 640 (2012).
190. Id. at 101, 47 A.3d at 641.
191. Id. at 102, 47 A.3d at 642.
192. The debt that supposedly motivated the killing might not, for instance, have been related
to BGF activity.
193. Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 498, 32 A.3d 2, 15 (2011).
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found that because the probative value of the evidence in question outweighed its danger for unfair prejudice, it should be admitted.194 Under the
facts in Burris, the court resolved the balancing test to reach the opposite
conclusion. 195 While the court was correct in doing so, 196 a prosecutor who
reads the Burris decision too narrowly could conclude that the error would
have been prevented simply by adding more expert testimony concerning
the prevalence of witness intimidation by gangs. The court could have prevented future unfair prejudice in this and similar cases if it had required a
showing of fact evidence relevant to each area of gang culture to which an
expert would testify.
In Gutierrez, while the court did not discuss it, there was ample and
undisputed fact evidence to support each properly admitted aspect of expert
testimony. The court found that the probative value gained by allowing the
State’s expert to testify came through his explanation of the phrase “Mara
Salvatrucha,” his description of the “jumping in” process by which one is
initiated into a gang, and his discussion of the import in gang culture of defending the gang’s honor. 197 This probative value, the court said, outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice that might arise if jury were to draw
a conclusion of guilt by association to a gang. 198 The court also found that
the trial court improperly admitted the expert’s statement that MS-13 was a
particularly violent gang because this statement “[did] little to add to the jury’s understanding of why the defendant was the person who committed the
particular crime charged.” 199 The court’s ruling corresponded with a basic
relevance requirement.200 The proposed condition that there be fact evidence to tie a gang expert’s testimony to aspects of gang culture in the case
is simply a more specific relevance requirement that would likewise have
excluded the offending statement in Gutierrez.
In contrast to the expert in Gutierrez, the Court of Appeals saw little to
no probative value to be gained from the testimony of the State’s gang expert in Burris. 201 This testimony did not explain what role a hit man would
play in an alleged extortion attempt nor why gang membership would explain witness recantation, and his identification of the defendant as a BGF
member added nothing that fact witnesses had not already said. 202 Indeed,
the court clarified that expert testimony has reduced probative value when-

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 498–99, 32 A.3d at 15–16.
Burris v. State, 435 Md. 370, 392, 78 A.3d 371, 384 (2013).
See infra text accompanying notes 201–210.
Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 498–99, 32 A.3d at 15.
Id. at 499, 32 A.3d at 15–16.
Id., 32 A.3d at 16.
See MD. R. 5-402 (“Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”).
Burris, 435 Md. at 395–96, 78 A.3d at 386–87.
Id., 78 A.3d at 386.
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ever it simply restates conclusions already asserted by fact witnesses. 203
The court’s position corresponds with Rule 5-403’s statement that evidence
may also be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
“needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 204 In this case, since multiple fact witnesses expressed personal knowledge that the defendant was a
member of the gang, it added little probative value for the state’s expert to
deduce the same conclusion. 205 On the other side of the balance, the expert’s testimony carried significant possibility of unfair prejudice.206 First,
Burris suffered the obvious risk that the jury would be more likely to convict him because of his association with a gang. 207 Second, multiple allusions to the fact that he had spent time in jail could lead to a conviction
based on a criminal past unrelated to the crime for which he stood trial.208
Finally, the expert’s analysis of his tattoos invited inferences regarding his
propensity for violence. 209 Given the lack of probative value, it is not surprising that the court, on balance, concluded the expert’s testimony was unfairly prejudicial. 210
The Court of Appeals also correctly pointed out the error in presuming
that expert gang testimony was justified to explain why the witnesses’ testimony did not match their pretrial statements or why a hit man would have
a role in a gang’s extortion schemes. 211 However, the court missed an opportunity to impose a requirement that the government present evidence
that each area of gang culture about which the expert shall speak is relevant
to the crime in question. For example, if the expert is to discuss the phenomenon of witness tampering, then the government should first present evidence of witness tampering, or if the expert is to discuss how extortion by
gangs works, then the government should first present evidence of extortion. Without such a requirement, a lower court could allow the prosecution to remedy its error simply by having its expert discuss gangs’ propensity to intimidate witnesses and to kill those who do not pay their debts, thus
adding more unfair prejudice to the testimony. In any case in which an ex203. See id.
204. MD. R. 5-403. Chief Judge Bell applied the same logic in his dissenting opinion in
Gutierrez, 423 Md. at 519, 32 A.3d at 27 (Bell, C.J., dissenting), and the court was right to adopt
it in Burris. If a fact witness has personal knowledge that the defendant is a member of a gang,
then logically, that should sway the jury more than an expert who reaches the same conclusion
through an examination of photographs, tattoos, or prison records. The testimony of the police
expert thus offers little additional probative value, but brings with it the potential prejudice of a
condemnation from a figure of authority.
205. Burris, 435 Md. at 395–96, 78 A.3d at 386.
206. Id. at 394–95, 78 A.3d at 385–86.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 392, 78 A.3d at 384.
211. Id. at 396–97, 78 A.3d at 386–87.
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pert testifies about witness intimidation, the lack of fact evidence indicating
actual intimidation is problematic because witnesses may revise their pretrial statements for other plausible reasons. For example, a witness might
change his testimony if the pretrial statement was inaccurate as a result of
improper interview tactics or even coercion by police. 212 While police interference with witness’s pretrial statements is not relevant under these facts,
the courts would do well to keep such a possibility in mind in other cases
where the government seeks to admit gang expert testimony as a means of
explaining witness recantation.
Just as evidence linking the crime to gang activity is necessary for the
proper admittance of testimony by a gang expert in the first place,213 it
makes sense that evidence tying a witness’s changed statement to gang intimidation should be necessary for the admittance of expert testimony on
the subject of gang coercion of witnesses. 214 Indeed, in each of the out-ofstate witness tampering cases to which the court turned for guidance in Burris, there was at least some fact evidence that gang members had actually
threatened the witnesses.215 Similarly, before a court permits an expert to
discuss the typical behavior of gang extortionists, the State should have to
present some evidence that the alleged creditor considered the other party to
owe him a debt. 216 In short, if the first step of a Gutierrez analysis is to
provide some assurance that the gang expert’s testimony will be relevant,
then the State should also bear the burden of showing through fact evidence

212. See, e.g., People v. Tolliver, 807 N.E.2d 524, 553–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (Campbell,
P.J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the trial court’s admission of witnesses’ prior inconsistent
statements was reversible error in light of substantial evidence that those statements were coerced
through lengthy detentions by police). To be clear, the defendant in Burris did not present evidence of any such impropriety, but then again, neither did the State present any evidence of gang
intimidation.
213. Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 496, 32 A.3d 2, 13 (2011).
214. Tolliver, 807 N.E.2d at 556 (“Prosecutors are forbidden from arguing or presenting testimony that a witness is afraid of a defendant, afraid to testify, or otherwise afraid due to involvement in a case unless the prosecution first directly connects such fears to defendant’s conduct.”).
215. See People v. Dixon, 882 N.E.2d 668, 671, 674, 675 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (detailing
statements made by multiple witnesses to prosecutors, police, and the grand jury that they were
scared, had received threats, or had been assaulted once it became known that they had made
statements about the defendant’s involvement in a murder); Tolliver, 807 N.E.2d at 532 (relaying
one witness’s grand jury testimony that she was visited by family members of a defendant, some
of whom belonged to his gang, who threatened to “blow up her apartment,” “whip her ass,” and
“kill her niece”); People v. Gonzalez, 135 P.3d 649, 653 (Cal. 2006) (recounting a statement by a
witness that he was reluctant to testify because he “might feel something might happen to [him]
after” testifying).
216. In Burris, the only evidence that Burris believed the victim owed Bam money came in
the form of a statement one of the witnesses made to police, 435 Md. at 376, 78 A.3d at 374–75,
which would have been hearsay even if it was not recanted at trial. See MD. R. 5-802 to 5-806
(declaring hearsay inadmissible and listing exceptions, none of which apply to the circumstances
at hand).
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that each area of gang culture to which the expert shall speak is relevant to
the crime in question.
V. CONCLUSION
The Burris court was correct in deciding that in a case where the prosecution alleges without evidence that gang intimidation was responsible for
the witnesses’ recantation of their pretrial statements, the potential for unfair prejudice from testimony by a gang expert outweighs the probative value of such testimony. 217 However, the court should have recognized the
importance of establishing a defendant’s gang involvement through clear
and convincing evidence, 218 specifying the correct evidentiary standard
necessary for fact evidence to establish a connection between gang activity
and the crime in question, 219 and establishing a requirement that all areas of
gang culture on which an expert testifies be first demonstrated through fact
evidence. 220 These three missing elements would provide necessary safeguards against unfair prejudice and would help ensure the kind of consistency and predictability that a criminal defendant requires in order to develop a trial strategy and adopt a meaningful defense.

217.
218.
219.
220.

See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.

